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Algorithms and Misinformation: The
Constitutional Implications of Regulating
Microtargeting
Talia Bulka*
The increased popularity of social media in recent years has
brought with it unwanted consequences. Most notably, the world is
experiencing a widespread epidemic of online misinformation and
disinformation. In the form of news stories and advertisements, false
information about candidates like Joe Biden, Hillary Clinton, and
Donald Trump has spread over Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and
TikTok. Since false information is often more sensational than the
truth, this information is reposted and shared until it reaches millions of people. However, the real culprit of this misinformation phenomenon is microtargeting—algorithms that exploit users’ personal
information and previous media interactions to target specific posts
to individual users. These algorithms send posts to users’ newsfeeds
without regard for the credibility of the information, leading users
to believe that what they are seeing is true. Further, microtargeting
intensifies political party polarization because users are only shown
posts with which they already agree. Can the government do anything about this? This Comment examines the extent to which microtargeting can be regulated without exceeding the confines of the
First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Social media users and online news readers have been swarmed
with information regarding various political candidates in the form
of political advertisements and news stories. Unfortunately, however, much of this information is false or misleading. Inaccurate information may affect voters’ perception of certain issues and influence their voting choices. It can even sway the outcome of elections.
Microtargeted news stories and advertisements are some of the
primary culprits spreading false political information to individual
users.1 Using algorithms, platforms display content to individual users based on their interests, deriving this information from users’

1

See Sara Brown, MIT Sloan Research About Social Media, Misinformation, and
Elections, MIT SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT. (Oct. 5, 2020), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-madeto-matter/mit-sloan-research-about-social-media-misinformation-and-elections
[https://perma.cc/9PVK-2LEL].
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data and previous media interactions.2 Since content is displayed
based on user preference and not accuracy of information, it is difficult for the viewer to discern what information is accurate. While
legislators and the public alike have called for a ban on microtargeting, such a law would likely violate the First Amendment because
algorithms associated with microtargeting purposely transmit substantive information.
This Comment proceeds as follows: Part I describes the role that
microtargeted stories and advertisements can have in spreading false
information. Part II asserts that algorithms used for microtargeting
are protected speech. Finally, Part III concludes by arguing that the
regulation of microtargeting could be accomplished through a content-neutral statute
I. BACKGROUND
A. Fake News
The 2020 election cycle was like no other.3 The COVID-19 pandemic pushed millions of Americans to vote early or by mail-in ballots.4 However, this newly popularized voting method came with a

2

Lata Nott, Political Advertising on Social Media Platforms, ABA (June 25, 2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/vot
ing-in-2020/political-advertising-on-social-media-platforms/
[https://perma.cc/SW4PNETZ]; see Veronika Balbuzanova, First Amendment Considerations in the Federal
Regulation of Social Media Networks’ Algorithmic Speech, Part I, ABA (Jan. 29, 2021),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/privacy-datasecurity/articles/2021/first-amendment-social-media-algorithmic-speech-part-1/
[https://perma.cc/KJ28-E6ZJ].
3
The 2020 election saw twenty-seven percent of Americans vote in person on Election
Day, compared to 2018 where fifty-five percent voted in person on Election Day. Drew
DeSilver, Amid Pandemic, the Long Decline of In-Person Voting on Election Day Is Likely
to Accelerate This Year, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2020/11/03/amid-pandemic-the-long-decline-of-in-person-voting-on-electionday-is-likely-to-accelerate-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/TH3A-QS5S].
4
According to the Pew Research Center, twenty-seven percent of Americans voted in
person before 2020 Election Day, forty-six percent voted by absentee or mail-in ballot, and
only twenty-seven percent voted in person on Election Day. Sharp Divisions on Vote
Counts, as Biden Gets High Marks for His Post-Election Conduct: The Voting Experience
in 2020, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 20, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/
11/20/the-voting-experience-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/7W6U-6YHR].
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surge of disinformation5 and misinformation.6 Stories circulated on
social media and various news sites alleged ballots were being
shredded, discarded, stolen, or cast by deceased citizens.7
Though most allegations were proven false,8 millions of Americans were already convinced that the stories of manipulated ballots
were legitimate.9 Many far-right conservatives were persuaded that
President Biden was trying to “steal” the election, leading to a movement that used the hashtag, “#StopTheSteal.”10 Facebook attempted
to shut down groups and pages aimed at “stopping the steal,” but
having already collected over 2.5 million followers, it was too late11
to stop the circulation of this fake news.12
This is not the first time that false information posed issues in a
Presidential Election. In 2016, numerous fake news stories spread
across the internet regarding Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump.13
5

Disinformation is defined here as “deliberately misleading or biased information” or
“manipulated narrative or facts.” Disinformation, DICTIONARY.COM, https://
www.dictionary.com/browse/disinformation [https://perma.cc/5W2E-TZHQ].
6
Misinformation means “false information that is spread, regardless of whether there
is intent to mislead.” Misinformation, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/
browse/misinformation [https://perma.cc/CCK9-FL32].
7
See ELECTION INTEGRITY P’SHIP, THE LONG FUSE: MISINFORMATION AND THE 2020
ELECTION 50, 54 (June 15, 2021), https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIPFinal-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6W7-ENLK].
8
See id. at 54.
9
Rob Kuznia et al., Stop the Steal’s Massive Disinformation Campaign Connected to
Roger Stone, CNN BUS. (Nov. 14, 2020, 11:08 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/13/
business/stop-the-steal-disinformation-campaign-invs/index.html
[https://perma.cc/L3RW-QQ4B].
10
See ELECTION INTEGRITY P’SHIP, supra note 7, at 50.
11
Kuznia, supra note 9.
12
Fake news is defined as “false news stories, often of a sensational nature, created to
be widely shared or distributed for the purpose of generating revenue, or promoting or
discrediting a public figure, political movement, [or] company.” Fake News,
DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/fake-news [https://perma.cc/
E7HW-H5SX].
13
See RICHARD GUNTHER ET AL., OHIO STATE UNIV., Fake News May Have Contributed
to Trump’s 2016 Victory, (Mar. 8, 2018), https://s3.documentcloud.org/
documents/4429952/Fake-News-May-Have-Contributed-to-Trump-s-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TC2W-X9TY]; see also James S. Robbins, No Collusion: How
Americans Were Fed a False Tale About Donald Trump’s 2016 Campaign, USA TODAY
(Nov. 9, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2021/11/09/trumpcollusion-indictment-false-accusations/6336510001/?gnt-cfr=1 [https://perma.cc/G6SB5KVP].
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An Ohio State University study found that a substantial number of
citizens14 did not vote for Hillary Clinton because of false claims
that “Hillary Clinton [was] in very poor health,”15 that “Pope Francis
endorsed Donald Trump for president prior to the election,”16 or that
while serving as Secretary of State, Clinton “approved weapons
sales to Islamic jihadists, including ISIS.”17
At the same time, many Americans believed that Donald Trump
colluded with Vladimir Putin to win the 2016 election.18 Even after
special counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation found this accusation
to be without merit, fifty-three percent of poll takers still believed
that Trump or members of his campaign conspired with Russia to
influence the election and prevent investigations into Russian influence on the Trump administration.19
Even without Trump’s influence, however, Russia utilized disinformation to gain an advantage in the 2016 election.20 During congressional hearings regarding the third-party use of social networks
and online services in the 2016 elections, several media companies
disclosed to Congress that Russian agents reached 126 million users
on Facebook with inflammatory posts, sent over 131,000 messages
on Twitter, and uploaded over 1,000 videos to Facebook.21 But how
did this misinformation and disinformation spread so quickly and
widely? The fault seems to fall on microtargeting.

14

The study analyzed the voting behaviors of 1,600 survey respondents nationally, 585
of which voted for Obama in 2012. GUNTHER, supra note 13.
15
Twenty-five percent of respondents in the national sample believed this claim,
including twelve percent of past Obama voters. Id.
16
Ten percent of the national sample believed this, as did eight percent of Obama
supporters. Id.
17
Thirty-five percent of the entire sample believed this claim, including twenty percent
of Obama voters. Id.
18
Robbins, supra note 13.
19
Id.; Chris Kahn, Despite Report Findings, Almost Half of Americans Think Trump
Colluded with Russia: Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2019, 6:09 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-poll/despite-report-findings-almosthalf-of-americans-think-trump-colluded-with-russia-reuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKCN1R72S0
[https://perma.cc/C8XF-993R].
20
See Mike Isaac & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Russian Influence Reached 126 Million
Through Facebook Alone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
10/30/technology/facebook-google-russia.html [https://perma.cc/5X63-VM62].
21
Id.
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B. Defining Microtargeting
Microtargeting is the use of “hyper-detailed data profiles” to target individual users.22 Companies like Facebook, Google, and Amazon23 exploit their users’ personal information, such as zip code,
sex, and age,24 as well as previous media interactions,25 to tailor
specific stories and advertisements to individual users.26 By programming algorithms,27 these platforms automatically select posts,
links, and stories28 that they believe will interest specific users and
prioritize these stories at the top of users’ search engine results and
social media feeds.29 The more information input into the algorithm,
the higher the algorithm’s accuracy and the more tailored the results
will be to a specific person.30 This method is not only employed by
technology companies, but also by news publications such as
Forbes, The Washington Post, Bloomberg News, and Associated
Press.31
Microtargeting has many benefits.32 First, it enables advertisers
to target only those groups interested in their product or messaging,
saving advertisers valuable time and resources.33 By the same token,
users receive information tailored to their specific interests instead

22

Nicholas Vinocur, The Movement to End Targeted Internet Ads, POLITICO (Apr. 2,
2021, 4:56 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/targeted-advertising-tech-privacy/#
[https://perma.cc/R7PU-C5HH].
23
See id.
24
See Nott, supra note 2.
25
See Balbuzanova, supra note 2.
26
See id.
27
An algorithm is defined as “a sequence of instructions that tell a computer what to
do.” ACCESS NOW, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 10 (2018)
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS], https://www.accessnow.org/cms/assets/uploads/2018/11/AIand-Human-Rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/MK9S-7C56].
28
See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The First Amendment and Algorithms, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ALGORITHMS 606, 619 (Woodrow Barfield ed., 2020).
29
See id. at 606; see also Balbuzanova, supra note 2.
30
See Karl Manheim & Lyric Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and
Democracy, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 121–22 (2019).
31
See BENJAMIN, supra note 28, at 619.
32
See generally Alex Baiocco, Benefits of “Microtargeting”: Why Online Ad Targeting
Tools Are Good for Free Speech and Democracy, INST. FOR FREE SPEECH (May 25, 2021),
https://www.ifs.org/research/benefits-of-microtargeting-good-for-free-speech-anddemocracy/ [https://perma.cc/EZ33-RB9M].
33
See id.
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of every story and advertisement at large, creating a richer online
experience.34 In terms of political advertising, microtargeting also
sends users focused and substantive messages about candidates,
highlighting specific policy goals instead of broad and nondetailed
information.35
Yet, algorithms associated with microtargeting are also responsible for spreading fake news.36 Posts are brought to an individual’s
attention based on that person’s likelihood of interest in a particular
story, not the story’s credibility.37 For example, a personal blog
about an election with the same look and feel as a story from The
New York Times can confuse users into thinking they are reading
news published by a trusted source.38 Combine this tactic with
catchy headlines and alluring images,39 and it becomes increasingly
difficult for certain users to distinguish between actual news and
fake news.40 If a user subsequently reposts a fake or misleading article, it becomes likelier that others will also encounter the article
and, perhaps, be similarly misled, expediting the spread of false information.41
Additionally, many posts containing false information are not
generated by human actors, but instead by artificial intelligence
(“AI”).42 AI allows computer programmers to create an infinite

34

See id. But see Ellen L. Weintraub, Opinion: Don’t Abolish Political Ads on Social
Media. Stop Microtargeting., WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/01/dont-abolish-political-ads-social-mediastop-microtargeting/ [https://perma.cc/7NDV-LB9Z] (explaining that microtargeting does
not allow ads to be “widely available”).
35
See id.
36
See Jonathan Haidt & Tobias Rose-Stockwell, The Dark Psychology of Social
Networks, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/
12/social-media-democracy/600763/ [https://perma.cc/F4RT-2AH8].
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See id.
40
See Nott, supra note 2.
41
See JOHN VILLASENOR, BROOKINGS INST., HOW TO DEAL WITH AI-ENABLED
DISINFORMATION (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-deal-withai-enabled-disinformation/ [https://perma.cc/ZC4F-N85P].
42
See id. Some scholars define AI as “the science of making machines do things that
would require human intelligence if done by [humans].” HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 27, at
8.

1114

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:1107

number of fake profiles that appear legitimate.43 The AI then encourages users to view and interact with the fake accounts based on
users’ previous engagements with similar profiles.44 Since these
fake accounts emulate authentic accounts, they can avoid detection
software aimed at identifying fake profiles.45
C. Calls to Regulate Microtargeting
As noted above, disinformation and misinformation can have
catastrophic effects on democracy.46 In a political setting, the public
receives “conflicting and contradictory” messages about the same
candidate, making it difficult to determine what information, if any,
is accurate and where a given candidate truly stands on a particular
issue.47 Further, individuals are primarily shown posts with which
they already agree, creating an echo chamber that entrenches users’
existing views and leading to increased polarization between political parties and viewpoints.48 The public does not encounter every
advertisement or story, resulting in few opportunities for counter
speech on contradictory or false information.49
Some technology companies aware of fake news’ consequences
have attempted to curb the spread of false information independently. For instance, Meta’s50 various platforms aim to flag posts
containing misinformation with the help of independent fact-checkers.51 If a post is labeled “false,” the company reduces its distribution to individual newsfeeds.52 Additionally, Meta attempts to

43

VILLASENOR, supra note 41.
See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 16.
45
VILLASENOR, supra note 4.
46
See supra notes 3–21 and accompanying text.
47
Vinocur, supra note 22.
48
See Brooke Auxier, 64% of Americans Say Social Media Have a Mostly Negative
Effect on the Way Things Are Going in the U.S. Today, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/10/15/64-of-americans-say-social-mediahave-a-mostly-negative-effect-on-the-way-things-are-going-in-the-u-s-today/
[https://perma.cc/ME3S-XMTC].
49
Weintraub, supra note 34.
50
Previously known as Facebook, Meta now owns both Facebook and Instagram.
51
Guy Rosen, How We’re Tackling Misinformation Across Our Apps, META (Mar. 22,
2021), https://about.fb.com/news/2021/03/how-were-tackling-misinformation-across-ourapps/ [https://perma.cc/6ZXH-ECKH].
52
See id.
44
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connect users to reliable information by attaching this information
to certain posts.53 In comparison, Twitter limits the impact of misleading posts by not featuring posts containing misinformation on
users’ newsfeeds.54 Twitter also hides tweets containing false information behind warning screens55 and suspends accounts engaged in
spreading disinformation.56
TikTok is another platform taking steps to reduce misinformation by fact-checking content related to topics where misinformation is common, such as COVID-19 and political elections.57 If
the platform is unable to verify information in a post, TikTok will
include a label specifying that the information is unverified.58 Further, before sharing questionable content, users receive a “caution”
message, encouraging them to think twice before sharing.59
Yet, misinformation and disinformation still spread at rapid
rates.60 There are a number of factors contributing to widespread
dissemination. First, content spreads across multiple platforms, preventing false information from being contained by the content moderation actions of a single platform.61 In addition, it can be difficult
to verify whether information is necessarily true or false with complete certainty.62 Facebook, for instance, only addresses information
53

Id.
See Shannon Bond, Twitter Expands Warning Labels to Slow Spread of Election
Misinformation, NPR (Oct. 9, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/
10/09/922028482/twitter-expands-warning-labels-to-slow-spread-of-electionmisinformation [https://perma.cc/V882-FWNQ].
55
Id.
56
Brakkton Booker, Facebook Removes ‘Stop the Steal’ Content; Twitter Suspends
QAnon Accounts, NPR (Jan. 12, 2021, 12:54 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/insurrection-at-the-capitol/2021/01/12/956003580/facebook-removes-stop-thesteal-content-twitter-suspends-qanon-accounts [https://perma.cc/G83T-MHXF] (“Twitter
said it has suspended more than 70,000 accounts sharing content about QAnon, the fringe
far-right conspiracy theory . . . .Among the false claims QAnon proponents put forward is
that President Trump is fighting a cabal of Satan-worshiping pedophiles.”).
57
Alexandra Marquez, TikTok to Warn Users About Sharing Misleading Content, NBC
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2021, 5:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/tiktok-warnusers-about-sharing-misleading-content-n1256668 [https://perma.cc/Q4S5-MU72].
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See ELECTION INTEGRITY P’SHIP, supra note 7, at 220.
61
Id. at 221.
62
See id.
54
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lacking a factual basis to ensure the platform does not interfere with
individual expression.63 Thus, when a post combines personal experience with potentially misleading information, Facebook may decide that the information does not meet its threshold of falsity and
will thereby choose not to moderate the content.64
Since company self-regulation is often insufficient and impracticable, there have been calls to regulate microtargeting at the federal level. In a Washington Post op-ed, Federal Election Commission Chair Ellen L. Weintraub argued that eliminating political-advertisement microtargeting would be a suitable solution to remedy
current issues surrounding political advertising.65 Since advertisements would be intentionally, widely accessible to the public, disinformation and misinformation could be more readily identified and
flagged or delisted, which would lead to greater accountability
among advertisers.66 Doing so could also curb much of the polarization caused by those who only see stories with which they already
align.67 Additionally, allowing users to see all political advertisements would create ample opportunity for counterspeech.68 Specifically, Weintraub argues that “ads that are more widely available
will contribute to the robust and wide-open debate that is central to
our First Amendment values.”69
Congress has also responded to these concerns. California Representative Anna Eschoo reintroduced a bill in the House of Representatives that would prohibit microtargeting related to political advertising.70 Known as the Banning Microtargeted Political Ads Act
of 2021 (“BMPAA”),71 the law would ban certain online platforms72

63

Id.
See id.
65
Weintraub, supra note 34.
66
Id.
67
Id.; see also Auxier, supra note 48 and accompanying text.
68
Weintraub, supra note 34.
69
Id.
70
Press Release, Anna G. Eshoo, House of Representatives, Rep. Eshoo Reintroduces
Legislation to Ban Microtargeted Political Ads (Aug. 5, 2021), https://eshoo.house.gov/
media/press-releases/rep-eshoo-reintroduces-legislation-ban-microtargeted-political-ads
[https://perma.cc/PK3Y-TPFV].
71
Banning Microtargeted Political Ads Act of 2021, H.R. 4955, 117th Cong. § 1 (2021).
72
A “covered online platform” is defined in this bill as:
64
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from targeting73 the “dissemination of a political advertisement.”74
However, the prohibition would not apply to individuals who consent to such targeting or those who have connected devices located
in broad geographies like states, municipalities, and congressional
districts.75
If broadly applied, a ban on microtargeting could force platforms
to cease using algorithms altogether to generate content, or at the
very least, force changes in algorithmic inputs.76 Assuming citizens
have a sufficiently prevalent desire to regulate microtargeted political advertisements, is a wholesale ban on microtargeting constitutional? What about a regulation forcing platforms to change the kind
of information input into algorithms, effectually altering the algorithmic output?
Before discussing the constitutional implications of microtargeting, a broader question must be answered: are algorithms speech entitled to First Amendment protection at all?

any website, web application, mobile application, connected device application, digital
application (including a social network, or search engine), or advertising network
(including a network disseminating advertisements on another website, web application,
mobile application, connected device application, or digital application) that disseminates
political advertisements, except that such term does not include a website, application, or
network (or a subsidiary or affiliate of such a website, application, or network) that, during
the [twelve]-month period ending on the date of the dissemination of the political
advertisement involved, collected or processed personal information relating to fewer than
50,000,000 individuals.
Id. § 325(d)(3).
73
“Target” means:
to perform or cause to be performed any computational process designed to select an
individual, connected device, or group of individuals or connected devices to which to
disseminate the political advertisement based on personal information pertaining to the
individual or connected device or to the individuals or connected devices that make up the
group.
Id. § 325(d)(15).
74
Id. § 325(a)(1).
75
Id. § 325(b)(1)–(2)(A); see also Press Release, Eshoo, supra note 70.
76
As discussed above in the text accompanying supra notes 70–73, the BMPAA is
aimed at changing the algorithmic input that companies use. Specifically, the Act would
restrict the use of personal information by companies as algorithmic inputs. Changing what
goes into an algorithm will consequently change the output.
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II. ALGORITHMS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This Comment argues that algorithms programmed to categorize
content based on user preferences—namely ones employed by
online platforms—should receive full First Amendment protections
consistent with current Supreme Court doctrine, since they purposely transmit content-based information. Both the degree of automation in these processes and platforms’ endorsement of displayed
content are inconsequential to this conclusion, as will be illuminated
in the context of the prevailing views on the issue. On one hand,
Professor Stuart Minor Benjamin argues that substantive algorithmic outputs are speech for First Amendment purposes.77 This contrasts with legal scholar Tim Wu’s theory of algorithms; specifically, that most are purely functional and are not protected speech.78
A. Algorithms as Protected Speech
Benjamin’s Article examining the relationship between algorithms and the First Amendment begins with an examination of
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,79 where the Court
concluded that video games merit First Amendment protection.80
This holding is significant because the Court explicitly created a low
threshold for what constitutes speech.81 Benjamin then discusses the
Court’s decision in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, where
cable operators carrying more than twelve channels or having more
than 300 subscribers challenged a statute requiring them to set aside
up to one-third of their airtime for commercial broadcast stations.82
Cable operators transmit speech through “original programming” or
by employing “editorial discretion” over which stations or programs
to include.83 In doing so, the Court found that cable operators
77

Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447
(2013).
78
Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1526 (2013).
79
564 U.S. 786 (2011).
80
Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1458. The Court stated that “[e]ven if we can see in them
‘nothing of any possible value to society . . . , they are as much entitled to the protection of
free speech as the best of literature.’” Brown, 564 U.S. at 796 n.4 (quoting Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
81
Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1458–59.
82
512 U.S. 622, 630 (1994).
83
Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1459 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 636).
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“communicate messages on a wide variety of topics” and are entitled
to First Amendment protection.84 The Court held that the statute encroached upon First Amendment rights by reducing the number of
channels over which cable operators exercised “unfettered control.”85
From this decision, Benjamin deduces that to merit First Amendment protection, cable operators must create or choose “substantive
messages” to air, and subsequently communicate such messages to
the public.86 Accordingly, algorithms should be entitled to similar
protection since they, too, purposely display substantive advertisements and news stories tailored to specific users.87
Benjamin contends that substantive communications can be sent
with or without algorithmic involvement, but algorithms are helpful
in automating the communication process.88 For example, the First
Amendment would protect someone who hangs a physical bulletin
board and posts every article she finds with the words “God is dead”
on it because the board communicates a message regardless of
whether the individual actually wrote the accompanying articles.89
Thus, if the individual automates the process by having a computer
search for the articles and automatically post them to a virtual bulletin board, the First Amendment would still apply.90 The analysis
is the same whether the process is physical or automatic.91
The same is true for search engines. For instance, when Google
ranks its search results based on what it believes users want to see,
the ranking itself communicates a substantive message, even though
Google does not create the speech.92 Google selects information to
show based on its perceived importance, value, and relevance to users.93 This, too, aligns with the Court’s requirement that a

84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Id.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 637.
Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1459.
See id. at 1470.
See id. at 1464–65, 1470.
Id. at 1464.
Id. at 1465.
Id.
See id. at 1470.
See id.
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substantive message be sent and received for the First Amendment
to apply.94
However, Benjamin clarifies that algorithms simply speeding
computer transmission or facilitating network efficiency do not
communicate substantive messages, and, thus, are not afforded First
Amendment protections.95 Benjamin is essentially correct in his argument; however, this point warrants greater clarification and examination. Specifically, one is not required to create content to merit
First Amendment protection; one is only required to intentionally
display the content.96 Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing radio, television, and internet transmissions makes this clear.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, the statute at
issue prohibited noncommercial educational broadcasting stations
from receiving certain federal grants if the stations engaged in “editorializing.”97 The Court held this violated the First Amendment
since radio broadcasters were engaged in a “vital and independent
form of communicative activity.”98 Therefore, the government
should rely on the broadcaster’s judgment, which includes editorializing.99 Further, public reception of “social, political, esthetic,
moral, and other ideas” through broadcasting is at the heart of the
First Amendment.100 This decision highlights that transmitting substantive content to the public is no less an act protected by the First
Amendment than creating or endorsing content. Though the issue in
this case relates to editorializing, the Court’s point was that

94

See Benjamin, supra note 28, at 622.
Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1481.
96
“If the acts of ‘disclosing’ and ‘publishing’ information do not constitute speech, it is
hard to imagine what does fall within that category . . . .” Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S.
514, 527 (2001) (quoting the lower court’s decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109,
120 (3d Cir. 1999)).
97
468 U.S. 364, 366 (1984).
98
Id. at 378.
99
Id. Editorialize is defined here as “to set forth one’s position or opinion on some
subject in, or as if in, an editorial or “to inject personal interpretations or opinions into an
otherwise factual account.” Editorialize, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/
browse/editorialize [https://perma.cc/D8FZ-VN8W].
100 Id. at 377.
95
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legislators should exercise caution when regulating broadcasters
since they transmit messages to the public.101
Similarly, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., the Court ruled that a strict scrutiny analysis should apply to
issues arising from cable-operated channels.102 The ruling was made
without reference to whether cable operators created or endorsed
specific television shows or movies; it only prohibited operators
from choosing a general category of content to display (e.g., sexually oriented programing).103 Hence, the First Amendment does not
require high levels of association between the speaker and the content. Algorithms surely meet this low threshold because they display
substantive messages based on user relevancy.104
The internet warrants even more protection. In Reno v. ACLU,
the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision striking
down a statute that prohibited the electronic transmission or digital
display of indecent or patently offensive messages.105 The Court
noted that the internet is the “most participatory form of mass
speech,” and is therefore deserving of the highest First Amendment
protection.106 Again, the First Amendment discussion at issue centered around forbidding individuals from choosing which content to
display—but this time, on the internet.107 In the digital context, it
seems there is even less leeway to regulate communication than that
permitted in the broadcast media realm.
This analysis is important when applied to algorithms. When a
search engine uses an algorithm to discern what content to display,
the output should be protected speech. It is irrelevant whether the
search engine itself creates or specifically endorses the content it
displays.108 The content merits First Amendment protection because

101

See id.
529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015)
(explaining that laws regulating content are subject to strict scrutiny).
103 See Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. at 809.
104
See Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1474.
105 See 521 U.S. 844, 858–59 (1997).
106
Id. at 863 (quoting the lower court’s decision in ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
883 (E.D. Pa. 1996)) (internal quotations omitted).
107
See generally id.
108 See text accompanying supra notes 97–106.
102
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the algorithm chooses to display certain substantive messages over
the internet based on relevance to users.109 End of story.
Benjamin’s theory also emphasizes that humans create algorithms.110 He argues that if AI becomes so advanced that machines
themselves begin choosing what messages to communicate without
any human input, then algorithms may not be considered speech for
First Amendment purposes.111
However, the First Amendment does not and should not focus
on the level of human input used to program a given algorithm. In
deciding whether a computer code is protected speech, the Second
Circuit discussed the process of computer code accomplishing a
task.112 For a computer code to yield results, a human must conduct
some action, even if it is only one click at the beginning.113 However, such momentary human action does not qualify the code as
speech.114 The real question is whether the code displays a substantive message,115 and the degree of human input is unimportant to
that question.116
Applying this to algorithms, even if AI advances to the point
where humans are no longer involved in choosing what messages to
communicate, the analysis should still focus on whether the output
is a substantive message, not whether a human was involved in

109

See Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1470.
Id. at 1478; see also Benjamin, supra note 28, at 631.
111 Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1481. “At that point, we might say that the connection to
the human creators is sufficiently attenuated that the results no longer reflect humans’
decisions about how to determine what to produce, such that there is no longer a human
sending a substantive message.” Benjamin, supra note 28, at 630.
112
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001).
113 Id.
114
Id.
115 The court describes a substantive message in terms of the code’s “expressive
elements.” Id.; see also Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 392 F. Supp. 3d 68, 86 (D.D.C. 2019)
(“Code is speech precisely because, like a recipe or a musical score, it has the capacity to
convey information to a human.”); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000)
(“Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information
and ideas about computer programming, . . . it is protected by the First Amendment.”).
116
“[T]he fact that the system used words as triggers and a human being as a conduit,
rather than programming commands as triggers and semiconductors as a conduit, appears
to us to be irrelevant for purposes of [a First Amendment] analysis.” Commodity Futures
Trading Com’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
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sending the message. A human necessarily created the AI, which
should be sufficient itself to merit First Amendment protection.117
Further, courts are ill-equipped to answer the question of
whether there is human interaction involved in algorithmic decisionmaking.118 Media scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan writes that even the
most knowledgeable technology experts are not experts specifically
in Google or Facebook’s operations, nor do they fully understand
the specific code deployed in each platform or the way society
shapes itself around data flows.119 Even Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg is likely unknowledgeable with such intricacies.120 Accordingly, judges certainly should not base First Amendment analyses on the level of human interaction utilized by AI; in fact, they
should not factor such interactions into the equation at all.
The oral arguments in Gill v. Whitford illustrate this point. The
appellee’s lawyer attempted to explain the fairly simple process of
computerized, data-driven gerrymandering maps and its impact on
democracy.121 Chief Justice Roberts responded, “[I]t may be simply
my educational background, but I can only describe [this] as sociological gobbledygook.”122
This type of ignorance toward modern technology has realworld implications. For example, judges are asked to issue Fourth

117

Even if AI acts human-like, real human input will always be necessary. For example,
algorithms employed by social media platforms cannot account for societal implications in
the content they display. See Antony Brydon, Why AI Needs Human Input (and Always
Will), FORBES (Oct. 30, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbestechcouncil/2019/10/30/why-ai-needs-human-input-and-alwayswill/?sh=771ae51f5ff7 [https://perma.cc/T7Q9-5FMM].
118
For example, in connection to self-driving cars, judges are being called on to decide
whether the car manufacturers or drivers are responsible for accidents. Thus far, judges
have yet to rule on issues of this nature. See Melissa Whitney, How to Improve Technical
Expertise for Judges in AI-Related Litigation, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-to-improve-technical-expertise-for-judges-inai-related-litigation/#footnote-1 [https://perma.cc/5SEY-PSNT].
119 Siva Vaidhyanathan, There’s No Such Thing as a Tech Expert Anymore, W
IRED (Aug.
4, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/theres-no-such-thing-as-a-tech-expertanymore/ [https://perma.cc/2VTZ-9NJQ].
120
See id.
121 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 161161).
122 Id. at 40 (No. 16-1161).
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Amendment search warrants for electronic data access without
knowing how the technology works or how invasive it can be.123
Based on these consequences, judges should not rule on technology
they do not use in their everyday lives.
B. Algorithms Beyond Functionality
On the other end of the spectrum, Tim Wu argues that generally,
algorithms are functional and should not be considered protected
speech.124 To merit First Amendment protection, Wu believes
speech must meet four criteria: personhood, speech, motive, and
abridgment.125 The following discussion focuses specifically on personhood and speech.
Beginning with personhood, courts have ruled that a speaker
must be a “person” to warrant First Amendment protection.126 Although algorithmic output may be the speech of the algorithm’s creator, Wu asserts it is only a vessel for the author’s ideas and that the
algorithm is not the speaker itself.127 Just like a typewriter used to
write a novel is not considered a speaker, algorithmic outputs of
computer programs are not speakers; they are purely functional

123

See Marla N. Greenstein, Judges Must Keep Up with Technology: It’s Not Just for
Lawyers, ABA (Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judicial/publications/
judges_journal/2014/fall/judges_must_keep_up_with_technology_its_not_just_for_lawye
rs/ [https://perma.cc/4RSD-8TRM].
124
See Wu, supra note 75, at 1526.
125 Id. at 1500.
126
See id. at 1500–02. In the case of Blackie the Talking Cat, a couple trained their cat,
Blackie, to say certain phrases in English in exchange for donations. In response to
opposition to a demand that required the couple to obtain a business license, the court held
that since Blackie was not a person, his free speech was not infringed upon. Miles v. City
Council, 710 F.2d 1542, 1543, 1544 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983). Similarly, courts have held that
young people have fewer First Amendment rights than adults. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (explaining that First Amendment rights of students
in public schools “are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings” (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)) (internal
quotations omitted)). However, the Supreme Court ruled that corporations are granted First
Amendment protections, implicitly conceding corporation’s equal standing with humans.
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (“The Court has thus rejected the
argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural
persons.’”(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).
127 See Wu, supra note 75, at 1504–05.

2022]

ALGORITHMS AND MISINFORMATION

1125

vessels to transmit information and are too far removed from the
original information.128 As another example, unlike Twitter users
who retain First Amendment rights, Twitter itself does not have First
Amendment rights in their users’ tweets.129 Though the company
facilitates tweets by controlling the character count and posting the
information, merely creating the software does not merit First
Amendment protections.130
To be protected under the First Amendment, a communication
must also be “speech.”131 Communications that lack ideas or content
are not considered speech, blurring the line between speech and algorithmic outputs.132 Wu highlights that if the First Amendment protected every type of communication, then honking a car horn would
be considered speech.133 Further, the First Amendment would start
to clash with other laws and regulations, such as contract law, employment law, and securities regulation.134
Wu is imprecise in his characterization of algorithms as simply
a vessel for a speaker’s ideas;135 the algorithmic output is the speech.
As Benjamin discusses, automating the communication of a message does not detract from the speech component, but instead eases
the communication process.136 Just as a human can post an article to
a bulletin board and receive protection, so should an algorithm that
automates posts.137 Therefore, an algorithm is unlike a typewriter or

128

Id. at 1505.
Id.
130
See id. at 1505–06.
131 Id. at 1500.
132
See id. at 1508. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the Court held that
video games are protected by the First Amendment, though the Court does not extend this
coverage to all computer programs. Id. at 1514 (discussing Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n,
564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)). But see Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547
U.S. 47, 64, (2006) (holding that schools are not considered speakers when they host
recruiting receptions because merely hosting recruiters is not an expressive activity).
133 See Wu, supra note 75, at 1508.
134
Id.
135 See text accompanying supra notes 127–28.
136
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying discussion.
137 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying discussion. The algorithmic output is
essentially a proxy for human speech, with little regard for how automated the process
becomes.
129
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a tweet138 because the output is the speech itself, not just a means of
transferring speech.
Moreover, the fact that an algorithm speaks on behalf of a human
does not warrant less protection for such speech. Restricting speech
based on the speaker’s identity is “all too often simply a means to
control content.”139 The Constitution prohibits the government from
singling out a class of speakers as a whole,140 so the same logic
should follow even if that class of speakers is algorithms.
Further, the concept of speech is interpreted broadly by courts.
A message filled with “dry information” and “devoid of advocacy,
political relevance, or artistic expression” is still protected speech.141
For example, information on a beer label142 or a credit report143 are
both protected. Similarly, code only readable by a computer still
maintains First Amendment protections because it conveys a message.144 Thus, algorithms that transmit substantive messages should
be protected.
According to Wu, courts should use the four criteria to decide
whether algorithmic outputs enjoy First Amendment protections.145
Wu focuses on functionality146 as the deciding factor to evaluate personhood and speech.147 Specifically, the First Amendment already

138

See supra text accompanying notes 128–130.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 170 (2015) (quoting Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010)).
140 See id.
141
IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 271–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001)), aff’d, 564 U.S.
552 (2011).
142
See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1995).
143 See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985).
144 See Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 448 (“Instructions that communicate
information comprehensible to a human qualify as speech whether the instructions are
designed for execution by a computer or a human (or both).”).
145 Wu, supra note 75, at 1517. The criteria include personhood, speech, motive, and
abridgment. Id. at 1500.
146 The functionality doctrine, sometimes described as the “nonfunctionality
requirement,” is a legal concept primarily used in intellectual property law. It denies the
usual protections of intellectual property law to expressive works if the work is primarily
intended to perform a task unrelated to the goals of the law. Id. at 1518.
147 See id. at 1517.
139
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contains a de facto functionality doctrine.148 If an actor’s involvement with information is too distant or mechanical—meaning the
individual does not choose the content, possess specific knowledge
of the information, or identify as the publisher of the information—
it is not considered speech.149 In Turner,150 cable operators only enjoyed First Amendment protections because they exercised editorial
discretion over, and were identified with, the content they carried.151
Conversely, telephone companies do not retain First Amendment
rights since they merely carry information from place to place without any association or regard to content.152
Moreover, Wu contends that the First Amendment does not protect communications that act as tools.153 For example, in deciding
whether a navigational chart was defective, courts declined to analyze the First Amendment claims.154 This illustrates that some communications do not express viewpoints but are instead meant to accomplish something on their own.155
Applying the functionality doctrine to algorithms, Wu predicts
that blog posts, tweets, photo streams, and product reviews will
merit First Amendment protections since they are forms of expression, despite being generated by computer programs.156 However,
search engines should not enjoy the same protections.157 Search engines like Google merely index and rank information to help users
find relevant websites; they do not sponsor or publish information

148

Id. at 1520.
Id. at 1521.
150
See supra discussion accompanying notes 82–85.
151 See Wu, supra note 75, at 1521 (discussing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 636–37 (1994)).
152 See id.
153
Id. at 1522.
154 Id. at 1522 n.125; see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339,
342–43 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a navigational chart was defective for the purposes of
products liability without analyzing the claim under the First Amendment); Fluor Corp. v.
Jeppesen & Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 468, 475 (Ct. App. 1985) (applying strict liability for a
defective navigational chart without analyzing the First Amendment claim).
155 See Wu, supra note 75, at 1523.
156
Id. at 1524.
157 See id. at 1526.
149
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themselves.158 These search engines’ primary purpose is to serve as
tools for users, not to persuade the users on specific topics.159
However, one does not have to create content for it to merit First
Amendment protection;160 transmitting a general type of content is
enough.161 In Turner, the Court required cable operators to carry
commercial broadcast stations.162 The issue was that operators were
not permitted to pick which channels to transmit,163 not that they
were being forced to endorse or identify with certain channels.164
This is dissimilar from telephone companies. Like courier services,165 telephone companies carry information without regard to
the content.166 The companies do not exercise choice in what content
is transmitted.167 Further, when laws attempted to restrict telephone
usage for certain types of calls, namely “phone sex,” such restrictions were struck down under the First Amendment.168
Algorithms that display search results are more like broadcasters
than telephone companies. Google search results are derived from a
user’s searched terms, personal information, and all past media

158

Id. at 1528.
See id. at 1530. Wu argues that Benjamin’s theory (that Google search results are
protected simply because they communicate information based on importance, value, or
relevance to the users) fails. If such were the case, then a coffeemaker design could also be
protected if the product was meant to convey the ideas of “precision” or “perfection,”
clearly an overbroad interpretation of the First Amendment. See supra notes 92–94 and
accompanying text; see also Wu, supra note 75, at 1529 & n.167.
160 See supra notes 96–106 and accompanying text.
161
See FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984)
(“[B]roadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity.”).
162 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 630 (1994).
163
Id.
164 The case makes no mention of cable operators being forced to endorse or identify with
any channels. See generally id.
165 Wu, supra note 75, at 1520.
166
See id. at 1497.
167 Telephone companies handle information, but do not identify with the information
they handle. See id. at 1520.
168
See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 122, 131 (1989) (holding
that the Communications Act prohibition of indecent or obscene commercial telephone
communications (“dial-a-porn”) was in violation of the First Amendment); see also Barr
v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2348 (2020) (concluding that a
statute prohibiting all robocalls to cell phones, except those relating to government-debt,
violated the First Amendment).
159
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interactions.169 The algorithm chooses what to display;170 it is dissimilar to a telephone or courier service that is not engaged in any
form of choice.
Wu is correct that purely functional tools should not elicit First
Amendment protections,171 but he is likely incorrect in his application to most algorithms. As Benjamin admits, algorithms that merely
speed computer transmission or facilitate network efficiency do not
receive First Amendment protections.172 But, the algorithms at issue
here are different. They are tools because they transmit information
and choose which content to display, even if in a seemingly insignificant way.173 In e-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., a
district court concluded that because Google’s search results are
based on relevancy to a user’s search, the results are opinions and,
therefore, merit First Amendment protection.174 The ranking and
display of information was sufficient to qualify as actual speech, not
just a tool.175
Based on the arguments set forth in this Part, microtargeting by
algorithms merits First Amendment protection. Microtargeting is
accomplished by humans programming algorithms to display stories
or advertisements based on users’ personal information and previous
media interactions.176 These algorithms are not merely vessels transmitting information; they are choosing which content to transmit
based on specific, pre-determined criteria.177 Thus, the outputs
should be considered speech, just as it would if a human personally
decided what to display on each users’ feed. Further, the focus on
advanced AI’s decision-making processes should be irrelevant under a First Amendment analysis. However, even if human are factored into the analysis, humans create AI to disseminate stories and
advertisements; even if the human creator is far removed from the
169

See supra notes 23–29.
See supra notes 23–29.
171 See Wu, supra note 75, at 1497.
172 Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1481.
173
See supra notes 23–29.
174 e-Ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla.
2016).
175 See id.
176
Nott, supra note 2; see also Balbuzanova, supra note 2.
177 See Nott, supra note 2; Balbuzanova, supra note 2.
170
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decision-making process at the output stage, it is still that human’s
speech.178
III. REGULATING MICROTARGETING
This Part examines the breadth of Congress’ authority to regulate or ban microtargeting in the context of First Amendment speech
categories, including commercial speech regulations, content-based
regulations, and content-neutral regulations. A statue seems most
likely to fail constitutional scrutiny if drafted to be a commercial
speech regulation, content-based regulation, or content-neutral regulations, at least in most cases; any motivation to abridge free speech
will unlikely pass constitutional muster. However, if the primary
motive of a content-neutral regulation is unrelated to the interest in
stopping political misinformation, there is a greater chance that it
will pass constitutional muster.
A. Commercial Speech Regulations
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment applies to commercial speech.179 Thus, speech that merely proposes a commercial transaction is protected.180 In reaching this conclusion, the Court discussed how freedom of speech not only protects speakers, but also the rights of people to “receive information
and ideas,” also known as the “right to receive.”181 Receiving commercial information is in the public’s best interest because it encourages consumers to be well-informed in their economic decisions.182
However, commercial speech can be regulated if an advertisement
is false or misleading in any way or if an advertisement proposes an
illegal transaction.183

178

See supra notes 112–22.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
180 Id. at 762.
181
Id. at 756–57 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)). “If there
is a right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising.” Id. at 757.
182
Id. at 765.
183 Id. at 771–72.
179
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In light of this decision, a statute prohibiting online platforms
from displaying false or misleading advertisements resulting from
microtargeting would likely pass constitutional muster. But, a regulation of this nature would be inadequate to protect against the harms
of microtargeting. First, content moderation would be extremely difficult. Some information cannot be proven false such that it could
be filtered out.184 Further, it may be challenging for an algorithm to
filter or verify false information immediately, since AI technology
cannot itself know whether information is truthful.185 In addition,
with the vast amounts of false information, retroactive deletion
within a communication is insufficient since content can spread exponentially by the time it is deleted.186
Additionally, many of the problems with microtargeting are not
related to advertisements. Microtargeting is used to transmit news
stories to users;187 only banning false and misleading advertisements
would still leave multiple channels vulnerable to disinformation.
Further, echo chambers caused by individualized newsfeeds188
would still be an issue even if false news stories were banned, because advertisements and news stories that cause individuals to become polarized are not necessarily false.189
Consider a statute regulating the criteria of information put into
an algorithm that is subsequently used to create advertising outputs.
For example, the BMPAA, mentioned above, would ban online platforms from targeting political advertisements toward users, except
when based upon location information.190 Political elements aside,
this law would usurp platforms’ ability to fully decide what to show

184

See supra text accompanying note 62.
“The problem with learning-based methods on fact-checking: moving targets, biased
data, and unclear definitions. This is . . . what I have been pondering, and what I think is
an impossible target for automation.” Nathan Lambert, AI & Arbitration of Truth,
TOWARDS DATA SCI. (June 1, 2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/ai-arbitration-oftruth-808b57a93a97 [https://perma.cc/UVK4-WJRK].
186 See text accompanying supra notes 11–12.
187
Benjamin, supra note 28, at 619.
188 See supra note 48 and attached discussion.
189
As discussed in the text accompanying supra note 48, one of the issues with echo
chambers is that users are only shown posts with which they already agree; the posts do
not necessarily have to be false.
190 See supra notes 7571–75 and accompanying text.
185
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individual users.191 Though there is no wholesale ban on specific
types of content, algorithms—as a proxy for human speech—would
be forced to display different content than if they were able to utilize
the full input of available information. This burden on the First
Amendment is no different than that at issue in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy, where pharmacists were banned from displaying drug
prices in advertisements, precluding consumers from seeing such
advertisements.192
However, statutes will be upheld if they pass the prescribed level
of constitutional scrutiny. For commercial speech, the Court applies
intermediate scrutiny, outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York as follows:
(1) the advertisement must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted governmental interest must be substantial;
(3) the regulation must directly advance the governmental interest;
and (4) the regulation must not be more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.193
Assuming the first prong is satisfied, a court must determine
whether there exists a substantial governmental interest.194 Courts
have accepted certain governmental interests as sufficient, such as
protecting citizens from misleading, fraudulent, and inaccurate information,195 and preserving citizens’ rights to vote freely and conduct reliable elections with integrity.196

191

See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
749–50 (1976).
193 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
194
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002) (concluding that a
government interest in preserving the effectiveness and integrity of the drug approval
process and the public health it provides as well as preserving the availability of
compounded drugs was substantial). But see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S.
60, 73 (1983) (holding that a government interest in shielding recipients from offensive
materials or aiding parents in controlling the manner of informing their children about
contraceptives was not substantial).
195
See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768–69 (1993) (banning personal solicitations
by CPAs to protect consumers from fraudulent or deceptive information and to protect
clients’ privacy were considered substantial interests).
196 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198–99 (1992) (“The right to vote freely for the
candidate of one’s choice is the essence of a democratic society.” (quoting Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964))). There is also a compelling interest in protecting voters
192
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To be constitutional, a regulation must advance the substantial
governmental interest in a “direct and material way.”197 The harms
must be real, and the regulation must materially alleviate the purported harms.198 This standard requires evidence in the form of studies or anecdotal evidence.199 Citing history, consensus, or common
sense can adequately show that a governmental interest is being furthered by a law.200
The last prong requires the regulation only be as extensive as
necessary.201 This is not a strict standard but requires a reasonable
“fit” between the legislature’s means and ends.202 It must be narrowly tailored, not necessarily the least restrictive way to achieve
the stated interest.203
The Supreme Court would likely strike down the BMPAA as
unconstitutional. Beginning with the second prong, the Court would
likely find that regulating microtargeting serves a substantial governmental interest. It spreads false information at an alarming rate
and infringes upon the integrity of the electoral process—both of

from confusion and undue influence as well as preserving the integrity of the election
process. Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228, 231 (1989).
197 Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
198
Id. at 770–71; see Bolger, 463 U.S. at 61, 73 (ruling that a statute prohibiting mailing
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives did not serve the government interest of
protecting children from seeing the material since parents typically control the mail
anyway).
199
See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 772; see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
626 (1995). There, the government provided statistical and anecdotal evidence in the form
of surveys indicating that citizens had negative feelings about direct mail advertising. Id.
at 626–27.
200 Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.
201
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
202 Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
203
Id.; see Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 633–34 (1995) (concluding that prohibiting lawyers from
using direct mail to solicit personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days is
reasonably tailored to the interest of eliminating targeted mailings causing distress to
citizens and leaves multiple other channels for lawyers to advertise); but see 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489–90, 507 (1996) (holding that prohibiting
advertising the price of alcoholic beverages and publishing any advertisements referencing
the price of alcoholic beverages was more extensive than necessary to promote the state’s
goal of temperance since purchases can be limited with increased taxation or educational
campaigns).
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which the Court has found to be substantial governmental interests.204
The third prong is likely satisfied as well. As discussed above,205
harm to democracy resulting from microtargeting is real and substantial. The public is given contradictory or false advertisements
about the same candidate, making it difficult to determine what information is correct and what a given candidate supports.206 Moreover, since users are shown posts with which they already agree, hyperpolarization is promoted among political parties.207 Therefore, a
statute banning all microtargeting from online platforms—except
that based on location information—would resolve this problem,
since the public would receive a wide range of information advertisements.208
However, the regulation would fail on the fourth prong. Even
with an intermediate level of scrutiny, banning all political advertising would still be more extensive than necessary for the reasons described below.209 A ban of this nature would also bring the statute
into the realm of content-based speech, requiring a strict scrutiny
analysis.210
B. Content-Based Speech Regulations
The government is prohibited from regulating speech based on
its content or the message it conveys, because it is inequitable for
the government to promote certain viewpoints over others.211 Therefore, a law regulating content would be subject to strict scrutiny,

204

See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768–69; Burson, 504 U.S. at 198–99.
See supra Part II.B–C.
206
Vinocur, supra note 22.
207 See Auxier, supra note 48.
208
See Weintraub, supra note 34.
209 See infra notes 242–44 and accompanying discussion.
210 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 165 (2015).
211
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995);
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991) (“[T]he government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the
specter that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the
marketplace. The First Amendment presumptively places this sort of discrimination
beyond the power of the government.”).
205
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regardless of the government’s motive, content-neutral justifications, or feelings toward the speech in question.212
This also applies in the context of commercial speech. In Sorrell
v. IMS Health Inc., a statute prohibited pharmacies and other regulated entities from selling and disseminating prescriber-identifying
information for marketing purposes.213 The statute barred pharmaceutical manufactures from using such information for marketing
purposes.214 The Court found this statute to be content-based because it specifically barred the use of specific information for marketing purposes.215 Further, the law singled out pharmaceutical companies, disfavoring a specific speaker.216 Even though marketing is
in the realm of commercial speech, the Court ignored this inquiry
and analyzed the statute under a content-based, strict scrutiny analysis.217
Moreover, algorithms employed by social media platforms are
commercial speech by nature since their primary purpose is to monetize promoted advertisements218—which is likely irrelevant to a
First Amendment analysis. Commercial speech doctrine treats content-based restrictions as such and does not seem to decrease protection based on any financial purpose associated with the speech.219
For example, the Supreme Court found a statute prohibiting all robocalls to cell phones—except for those related to government
debt—content-based.220 The Court emphasized that there was no
reasonable differentiation between government-debt collection
speech and other categories of robocall speech, including

212

Reed, 576 U.S. at 165.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 562–63 (2011).
214
Id.
215 Id. at 564.
216
Id.
217 The Court does not conduct a commercial speech analysis. See id. at 565.
218 Facebook’s business model is centered on selling advertisements to be viewed by
users, earning the company $86 billion in revenue last year. Anna Edgerton et al., How
Facebook Algorithms Can Fight Over Your Feed, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2021, 10:56 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-25/how-facebook-algorithms-canfight-over-your-feed-quicktake [https://perma.cc/6ZLL-4JUF].
219
Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2348 (2020).
220 Id.
213
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commercial speech.221 Although robocalls are commercial in nature,
the Court treated the statute as content-based and applied strict scrutiny.222
The strict scrutiny inquiry asks if a statute is sufficiently narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest, and
if it is the least restrictive option to serve that interest.223 In terms of
strict scrutiny, compelling governmental interests include protecting
the right to vote freely and conduct elections with integrity and reliability.224 To promote a compelling interest, the government must
show a direct causal link between the statute’s restriction and the
harm it purports to prevent, supported by actual evidence.225 Further,
when deciding if a statute is narrowly tailored, the Court asks
whether the curtailment of free speech is necessary to solve the problem.226 Finally, the law cannot be underinclusive or overinclusive.227
1. Political Speech
Restricting political advertisement microtargeting would likely
be considered content-based on its face. The bill singles out political
advertisements over other subject matters and targets specific

221

Id.
See id. at 2347.
223
United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
224 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198–99 (1992); see also supra note 196.
225
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725–26 (2012) (reasoning that the
government’s assertion that it is common sense that false representations have the tendency
to dilute the meaning of military awards is insufficient to overcome strict scrutiny); see
also Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 800 (2011) (rejecting evidence that
violent video games are harmful to children since the research was based on correlation
evidence, not causation, and most studies had flaws in their methodology).
226 See Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
227
See Burson, 504 U.S. at 206–07 (concluding that a law prohibiting the solicitation of
votes within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place is not overinclusive because
forbidding solicitation protects all intimidation, not just blatant and specific attempts). But
see Brown, 564 U.S. at 802, 805 (ruling that the act was underinclusive because children
can use video games with parental consent and overinclusive because it presupposes that
parents want to prevent their children from buying violent video games).
222
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speakers—namely, online platforms.228 Therefore, the BMPAA
would warrant a strict scrutiny analysis and likely fail.229
Notably, the Court recognized an important and substantial governmental interest in ensuring balanced coverage of public issues.230
However, this was in relation to broadcasting during times when the
number of broadcasting frequencies available were scarce.231 The
same is generally inapplicable to print media since there is no issue
of spectrum scarcity.232 Accordingly, in the print media context, the
government must not infringe upon the public’s free discussion of
governmental affairs.233
Online platforms that employ algorithms are more similar to
newsprint publications than traditional broadcasting, as there is virtually unlimited space to publish online and people now consume
news online as a replacement to traditional print publications.234
Digital platforms are also unlike cable news and radio, both of which
are regulated to some degree in terms of indecent materials.235 Thus,
a governmental interest in allowing users to receive balanced

228

See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564 (2011) (explaining that the
law as issue was content based, since it disfavored a specific speaker).
229
Laws regulating content are subject to strict scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576
U.S. 155, 165 (2015).
230
FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984).
231 See id.
232
Id.
233 See Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 257–58 (1974) (concluding
that a “right of reply” statute, requiring newspapers to print replies from candidates who
were assailed by the newspaper, was unconstitutional).
234 Social media sites surpassed print newspapers as a news source. Elisa Shearer, Social
Media Outpaces Print Newspapers in the U.S. as a News Source, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec.
10, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/social-media-outpacesprint-newspapers-in-the-u-s-as-a-news-source/ [https://perma.cc/KQY4-WJX4]. One in
five U.S. adults say they get news via social media, slightly higher than those who get their
news from print newspapers (sixteen percent). Id. When looking at online news use
combined with the percentage of Americans who get news from either news websites or
social media, the web is coming close to television as a source for news (forty-three percent
of U.S. adults get news from news websites or social media, compared with forty-nine
percent for television). Id.
235
For example, the FCC may restrict indecent materials when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience. FCC, THE FCC AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1 (2019),
https://www.fcc.gov/sites/default/files/the_fcc_and_freedom_of_speech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HW32-UV4X].
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viewpoints through prohibiting microtargeting would likely be rejected by the Court, just like the print media context.236
Another substantial governmental interest related to microtargeting is protecting election integrity.237 However, it is unlikely the
BMPAA sufficiently promotes this interest. Though there are studies about the negative effects of microtargeting on democracy, these
studies only indicate correlation, not causation.238 It is difficult to
assess with certainty what exactly causes specific voting patterns
and ideologies.239 It may be that social media generally encourages
political extremism to obtain likes and followers, rather than specific
targeting of that information.240
However, the Court has stated that laws aimed at protecting the
right to vote have “such a compelling interest,” that the government
is not required to demonstrate strong evidence of political stability
for the law to pass strict scrutiny.241 Accordingly, if less emphasis is
placed on the type of evidence required to show the promotion of a
governmental interest, there is a possibility that the Court may find
the BMPAA serves an interest in protecting democracy.
Nonetheless, the BMPAA is not narrowly tailored. Political
speech is the cornerstone of protected speech, requiring the highest
degree of scrutiny.242 The BMPAA is overinclusive because it regulates political advertising for all covered online platforms;

236

See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying discussion.
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
238
Evidence shows that political microtargeting can increase polarization and
fragmentation; however, it can also enhance democracy by increasing the level of political
literacy throughout society. Judit Bayer, Double Harm to Voters: Data-Driven MicroTargeting and Democratic Public Discourse, INTERNET POL’Y REV., Aug. 11, 2020, at 1,
9,
https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/double-harm-voters-data-driven-microtargeting-and-democratic-public-discourse [https://perma.cc/BLF5-895T].
239 See generally Elizabeth Kolbert, How Politics Got So Polarized, NEW YORKER (Dec.
27,
2021),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2022/01/03/how-politics-got-sopolarized [https://perma.cc/F2VR-F3G8].
240 Id.
241
See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 208 (1992). The Court does not require strong
evidence of empirically drawn, objective effects on political stability when laws are aimed
at protecting the right to vote. Id.
242 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“The First Amendment ‘has
its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office.” (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989))).
237
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however, findings indicate that social media platforms feature the
greatest quantity of false information of all platforms.243 Hence, regulating search engines and certain websites244 would target more
speech than necessary.
Additionally, the BMPAA only regulates political advertisements, not political news stories, despite misinformation’s derivation from both sources.245 If the statute also applied to political stories, it would require the same strict scrutiny analysis, but would be
even less likely to survive constitutional muster since “the press
must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints.”246 Consequently, the
BMPAA would likely be struck down as unconstitutional.
C. Content-Neutral Speech Regulations
The regulatory option most likely to survive constitutional muster is to regulate microtargeting in a content-neutral manner, with
the substantial governmental interest being unrelated to democratic
effects of microtargeting. Content-neutral regulations serve purposes unrelated to the expression’s content, despite occasional, incidental effects on some messages.247 Such regulations come in the
form of time, place, and manner restrictions, as well as laws of general applicability.248

243

See Brown, supra note 1.
The BMPAA does “not include a website, application, or network . . . that, during the
[twelve]-month period ending on the date of the dissemination of the political
advertisement involved, collected or processed personal information relating to fewer than
50,000,000 individuals.” Banning Microtargeted Political Ads Act of 2021, H.R. 4955,
117th Cong. § 325(d)(3) (2021).
245
See Haidt & Rose Stockwell, supra note 36 (discussing misinformation in news
stories); see also Mike Isaac, Facebook Ends Ban on Political Advertising, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/03/technology/facebook-ends-ban-onpolitical-advertising.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2022) (discussing false information in
political advertisements).
246
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
247 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
248
See id. at 792; see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 377 (1968)
(holding that a statute prohibiting the intentional destruction of a draft card passed
constitutional scrutiny because the government interest was unrelated to the suppression of
free speech).
244
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1. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
The government may enact regulations restricting the time,
place, and manner of protected speech, so long as the restrictions are
justified without reference to the content of speech, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave ample
alterative channels open for communicating the information.249 In
deciding whether there is content-neutrality, the Court should look
to whether the governmental motivation to regulate is based upon
disagreement with a specific message or viewpoint.250 This inquiry
is another form of the intermediate scrutiny test.
In Hill v. Colorado, the state declared it unlawful to knowingly
approach another person to disseminate leaflets outside a health care
facility without that recipient’s consent.251 The government’s interest was to protect the health and safety of citizens.252 The Court upheld the statute as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation since it did not regulate speech, and, instead, only regulated the
place where certain expressions could occur.253 Further, the law was
not adopted to suppress a certain type of speech.254 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court emphasized that the statute’s legislative history did not indicate disagreement with any particular message, nor
did the text of law refer to any specific speech content.255
It is possible to frame a statute like the BMPAA as a time, place,
and manner restriction because it seeks to regulate the means of advertising, not the advertisement’s substance.256 The BMPAA would
ban covered online platforms from targeting advertisements to users, not the content of the advertisements, essentially creating regulation on marketing.

249

Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
Id. The sound-amplification guideline was enacted so the city could control noise
levels at events and maintain the character of the town. It had nothing to do with content.
Id. at 792.
251 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000).
252
Id. at 715.
253 Id. at 719.
254
Id.
255 Id.
256
See Banning Microtargeted Political Ads Act of 2021, H.R. 4955, 117th Cong. §
325(a)(1) (2021).
250
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In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,
the ordinance in question required businesses to obtain licenses if
selling items designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs.257 The
ordinance did not prohibit the act of advertising, just the means of
marketing certain items.258 The ordinance did not implicate commercial speech interests because restricting the manner of marketing
did not appreciably limit the communication of information.259
However, in other circumstances, the legislative history of a similar
statute could suggest that the real interest was in limiting the types
of political information users can obtain—a clear content-based motivation.
Moreover, the Court could find the BMPAA to be content-based
on its face, as it did in Sorrel.260 Just as a regulation prohibiting pharmacies from using prescriber-identifying information for marketing
purposes was content-based (since it disfavored specific speakers),
prohibiting online platforms from using information for marketing
purposes is also content-based because it specifically disfavors
online platforms.261 Thus, the BMPAA will likely be subject to strict
scrutiny and rejected on that basis.
2. Laws of General Applicability
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court reasoned that when speech
and nonspeech elements are combined, an important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify the incidental burdens on the speech element.262 This inquiry involves an
intermediate scrutiny analysis, requiring a regulation: (1) be within
the constitutional powers of the government; (2) further an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) be unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and (4) ensure that any incidental
restriction on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential
to further that interest.263

257
258
259
260
261
262
263

Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 491 (1982).
Id. at 496.
Id.
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64 (2011).
See id.
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
Id. at 377.
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Assuming the first prong is satisfied, the substantial governmental interest must not demonstrate a “motive” to restrict the content
of communication.264 In O’Brien, the Court upheld a statute265 that
promoted the government’s substantial interest by assuring the
availability of issued Selective Service certificates and was not
aimed at suppressing communications.266 The Court declined to
strike down the statute on the basis of an illicit legislative motive to
suppress freedom of speech.267 Further, the Court emphasized that
inquiries into congressional motive and purpose should be performed with caution.268 Looking to statements by legislators, for instance, is inadequate because what motivates one legislator to enact
a statute is not necessarily what motivates another.269
To successfully regulate microtargeting, the governmental interest likely cannot seek to protect the right to vote freely and conduct
elections with integrity and reliability; such motivation would regulate speech. This regulates speech on its face because the motivation
is to stop individuals from seeing certain news stories or political
advertisements.270 This certainly qualifies as speech-related.
264

Wu, supra note 75, at 1514–16 (“Burning down someone’s house can be
communicative—it suggests, at a minimum, disapproval of the resident or perhaps his
tastes. Nonetheless, a defense that states the arsonist is protected by the First Amendment
because he was expressing his hatred for his rival would usually be thrown out without
much consideration. In contrast, in a prosecution for burning a flag at a protest . . . the First
Amendment analysis will be triggered as a matter of course.”).
265
The statute prohibited “the knowing destruction or mutilation” of Selective Service
registration certificates. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370.
266
See id. at 382.
267
Id. at 382–83 (“The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support
whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on
the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted.”
(quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904))).
268
Id. at 384 (“We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation
which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its
exact form if the same or another legislator made a ‘wiser’ speech about it.”); see also
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567–68 (1991) (“It is impossible to discern,
other than from the text of the statute, exactly what governmental interest the Indiana
legislators had in mind when they enacted this statute, for Indiana does not record
legislative history, and the State’s highest court has not shed additional light on the statute’s
purpose.”).
269 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383–84.
270
The BMPAA is aimed at stopping the practice of “convey[ing] conflicting and
contradictory messages to different people.” Press Release, Eshoo, supra note 70.
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However, if a stated interest is unrelated to the democratic process,
such as promoting privacy, the Court may accept it as substantially271 unmotivated by a desire to suppress speech.272 Though privacy rarely trumps the First Amendment,273 the Court has accepted
this interest as sufficiently substantial beyond the First Amendment
context.274
Therefore, a law restricting the types of targeted information utilized by algorithms275 may pass constitutional muster in the privacy
context since it would be unrelated to suppressing speech, but instead, protect the privacy of users’ information.276 In O’Brien-type
laws, the Court declines to extensively inquire into whether a purported governmental interest is legitimate.277 Thus, a content-neutral
law regulating microtargeting would likely be most successful to
prioritize privacy interests over democratic interests. Further, the
Court would likely reject claiming a privacy interest in the context
of commercial speech regulations, content-based regulations, or

271

See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 625 (1995) (concluding that protection
of potential client’s privacy was a substantial state interest).
272 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (holding that a law prohibiting the
intentional disclosure of contents of an electronic communication—when one knows that
the information was obtained through an illegal interception—was a content-neutral law of
general applicability because the purpose of protecting the privacy of wire and oral
communications was without reference to the content of the regulated speech).
273
A privacy interest was insufficient to justify a law prohibiting publication of truthful
information about a matter of public significance. Id. at 527–28.
274 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (allowing government access
to cell-site records goes against an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his
physical location and provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only
his particular movements, but also his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations).
275
This can encompass personal information demographic information as well as
previous media interactions. See text accompanying supra notes 24–25.
276 Caitriona Fitzgerald, Deputy Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center,
praised the BMPAA for protecting privacy. She stated that it would prohibit targeting users
based on data they do not even know has been collected about them, since it would
essentially ban online platforms from targeting individuals based on their personal
information. See Press Release, Eshoo, supra note 70. This is an important step in
protecting privacy and democracy.
277 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84 (1968).
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time, place, and manner laws since the Court typically makes a more
substantial inquiry into such regulations.278
The regulation should also be no broader than necessary to further a privacy interest if it allows users to opt-in to having their information used for targeting purposes. In this way, the plain text of
the statute would indicate privacy as the main concern, not democracy. However, there is a possibility that the Court would not consider privacy a sufficiently substantial interest to overcome the incidental burden on speech.279 Under these circumstances, regulating
microtargeting would be extremely difficult absent a significant
change to First Amendment doctrine.
D. Regulating Outside the BMPAA
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, there is little leeway to
regulate microtargeting. Yet the harms associated with the practice
are substantial.280 Since platforms themselves are unable to adequately moderate content,281 government action is necessary to ensure a stable and thriving democratic society. This should not be in
the form of a categorical exception for algorithmic-based decisions282 since doing so would burden speech in meaningful ways.283
Instead, efforts should focus on regulating social media platforms
where false information is most widely and rapidly spread.284
This can be accomplished through enforcement actions by the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The FTC is typically
278

See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 762, 771–72 (1993) (explaining that
commercial speech regulations must alleviate the purported harm, supported by evidence
including studies or anecdotal evidence); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 725–26
(2012) (requiring content-based regulations to show a direct causal link between the
restriction and the harm to be prevented, supported by actual evidence); Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (showing that in the context of time, place, and manner statues,
the Court emphasizes the statute’s legislative history). But see O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384
(declining to inquire into congressional motive for content-neutral statutes).
279 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 555–56 (2001) (holding that a privacy
interest was not substantial enough to prohibit the disclosure of truthful information in the
matter of public interest).
280 See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying discussion.
281
See text accompanying supra notes 60–64.
282 See Benjamin, supra note 77, at 1457 (discussing this solution).
283
See supra Part III.B.
284 Brown, supra note 1.

2022]

ALGORITHMS AND MISINFORMATION

1145

responsible for charging companies with privacy violations under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, barring “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”285 Though the FTC rarely chooses to do so, only undertaking
101 privacy-related actions from 2008 to 2018,286 under a new presidential administration, they may be compelled to take greater action.
Since the FTC would be acting in relation to platforms’ exploitation of users’ personal information, the First Amendment would
unlikely be implicated. Moreover, with increased FTC oversight,
platforms would likely become more accountable for posted content, forcing the platforms to improve content-moderation techniques, or at least be transparent in the way their algorithms operate.287
Absent government action, it is up to social media platforms to
adequately moderate content and limit the use of microtargeting
when possible. Platforms have yet to satisfactorily do so.288 However, with enough pressure from users, increased media attention,
and government criticism, platforms may begin to self-regulate in
an effective way. Until then, users must be diligent in factchecking
news stories and advertisements and make a conscious effort to engage with views other than their own.
CONCLUSION
This Comment considers whether the government can constitutionally regulate microtargeted political advertisements and news
stories to combat rapidly spreading false information about elections
and political candidates. Targeted algorithmic outputs are likely
285

FTC, PRIVACY AND SECURITY ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/privacy-security-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/V5UM-96TV]; see also Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C §
45(a)(1).
286 See Rethinking Privacy for the AI Era, F
ORBES (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:16 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insights-intelai/2019/03/27/rethinking-privacy-for-the-aiera/?sh=627e15207f0a [https://perma.cc/6GS7-MDW5].
287
See Yaël Eisenstat, How to Hold Social Media Accountable for Undermining
Democracy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 11, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/01/how-to-hold-socialmedia-accountable-for-undermining-democracy [https://perma.cc/64M9-VZAG].
288 See ELECTION INTEGRITY P’SHIP, supra note 7, at 220.
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protected speech under current First Amendment doctrine because
platforms purposely sort and transmit substantive information.
Thus, it is doubtful that microtargeting can be regulated in the context of political advertisements and news, since doing so would be a
content-based restriction and would likely fail constitutional muster.
Until the government or online platforms can find ways to adequately moderate content to field misinformation and disinformation, users must diligently factcheck news and advertisements
and make conscious efforts only to spread truthful information. Doing so will enable our democracy to not only survive, but thrive.

